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Two key features can sum up the French industrial relations system that emerged after 
the World War ii and lasted until the late 1970s. Firstly, French trade unionism dif-
fers from its European counterparts by its fragmentation (five nationally recognised 
representative trade union confederations), a structural weakness in membership 
numbers, yet an ability to muster considerable collective force. From 1945 to the 
end of the 1970s, period of economic growth, France was one of the most strike-
prone countries in Western Europe. This industrial action stemmed, in particular, 
from the militant power of the Confédération Générale du Travail (cgt), closely 
tied to the French Communist Party (pcf), one of France’s main political parties at 
that time. In this economic and political context, trade union struggles subsequently 
contributed to obtaining social compromises introducing job protection regulations 
and providing access to a social security system (health insurance, retirement rights 
followed by unemployment benefits).
Since the mid-1980s, however, French trade unionism has been gripped by a 
combination of several crises with a steep drop in membership numbers, followed 
by a political crisis with the electoral collapse of the pcf and the conversion of the 
French Socialist Party (ps) to liberalism (Rioufreyt, 2019). These political changes 
have undermined the support and ideological bases that had powered union action 
up to then. To cap it all, in 1984, the turn to austerity took hold during the François 
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Mitterrand’s first term, the first Socialist President of the 5th Republic. This was 
the beginning to an almost uninterrupted wave of neo-liberal reforms to labour 
market rules and the welfare system. These reforms were intended to support busi-
ness competitiveness in a global economy but resulted in the rise of precarious jobs 
(temporary work, fixed-term contracts) and a softening in redundancy and breach 
of contract procedures (Signoretto, 2015). At the same time, a series of reforms 
meant to cut the ‘cost’ of work and reduce public sector deficits resulted in raising 
the age of retirement, to streamline the management of the health insurance system 
and tighten the criteria to access unemployment benefit.
This neo-liberal step-change went hand-in-hand with the development of con-
certation and bargaining institutions, both in the workplace and at the national 
level (Béroud and Galvão, 2019). For example, in 2007, the Larcher Act obliged the 
government to first consult with trade unions and employers’ representatives when it 
wanted to reform labour laws. It offered social partners the option of negotiating an 
agreement before the legislative process took effect. In doing so, successive govern-
ments increasingly sought to bolster the legitimacy of economic and social reforms 
by claiming responsibility their negotiated nature. This desire also transformed 
French trade unions by seeking to foster the emergence of a more ‘reformist’ form 
of trade unionism more willing to negotiate ongoing reforms rather than contest 
by collective mobilizations.
These liberal policies are part of a wider transformation of European social models 
(Andolfatto and Contrepois, 2016). Nevertheless, they have met with strong trade 
union resistance, especially in the 2000s, marked by a series of periods of protests on 
a very large scale. This temporary revival of trade union protest could not, however, 
hide the extent of change in the French trade union landscape and the consequent 
erosion of its power to mobilize in the long-term. Compared to the 1980s, the 
intensity of strike activity has clearly declined. This decline is not linear (Vandaele, 
2016). During the 2000s, there has been a revival of strike activity and other forms 
of trade union protests (Béroud et al., 2008). Yet, collective labour disputes expe-
rienced a pronounced dip in the 2010s, while liberal labour market and welfare 
system reforms continued apace. 
To emphasis the way in which French trade unions greet the neo-liberal reforms 
they face, this paper seeks to analyse the structural changes that hinder the growth 
of trade union action, together with more circumstantial processes that might ex-
plain its extent variation. More often than not, the study of contemporary trends 
of strikes activity focuses on one of its many possible explanatory factors: economic 
determinants, institutional explanations or organizational variables. I think more 
useful to draw on the Franzosi’s approach taken from his analysis of changes to strike 
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action in Italy (Franzosi, 1995). It draws on the different paradigms of strike analysis 
to reconstruct how economic, political and organisational changes together affect 
the strategies of union representatives when dealing with neo-liberal reforms. At 
the same time, this article aims at showing the need not to consider French trade 
unionism as a category of homogenous actors. On the contrary, neo-liberal reforms 
make union divisions much visible. After reviewing the meaning of these trade union 
cleavages, this article sheds light on the new forms that the waves of protest against 
neo-liberal reforms are taking and questions the persistent limits of the capacity of 
trade union organizations to prevent their implementation.
French trade unionism facing up to crises (1984-1995)
The switch to neo-liberal policies in France in the 1980s hit the trade union field just 
when it was facing internal changes. Indeed, the 1970s were marked by an alliance 
between the two biggest trade unions, the Confédération Française Démocratique 
du Travail (cfdt) and the cgt1. This coalition was an extension of the electoral co-
alition between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, intended to challenge 
the monopolization of the political power by the right-wing parties. At this time, 
the cgt and the cfdt represented almost 80% of trade union members. So, their 
coalition helped fuel an unprecedented surge in social conflicts during the 1970s, 
with frequent mass demonstrations. But, after a fresh defeat of the Left in the 1978 
General Election, the cfdt leaders distanced themselves from a model for trade 
unionism that was deemed overly political. Faced with a falling membership, the 
cfdt thought it better to separate trade union and partisan struggles to prioritise 
the search for compromises with the government and employers through collective 
bargaining. They considered it a way of regaining credibility for trade union activi-
ties from an employee perspective. This new rift between the trade unions was an 
initial hindrance to the growth of union-backed opposition to the austerity policies 
brought in by the Socialist government in 1984.
Trade union divisions faced with the liberal turning point
In response to the economic crisis and mass unemployment in France at the time, 
the Fabius government adopted wage restraint policies and encouraged greater flex-
1. The French trade union movement is basically split into 5 representative union confederations. The 
cgt and the cfdt are the two largest unions, followed by Force Ouvrière (fo), the Confédération 
Générale des Cadres (cfe-cgc) and the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (cftc).
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ibility into the labour market. Despite these measures the cfdt continued on a more 
reformist path. The cfdt’s leaders actually condemned the old ideology of striking, 
“which has fallen out of favour as many employees realise that they put increasing 
pressure on companies that are already struggling to maintain their jobs”2. With 
rising mass unemployment, changes to the French economy (deindustrialisation 
and globalisation) coupled with the rapid decline in trade union membership, the 
leaders of the cfdt thought that French trade unionism had to change its practices. 
They firstly rallied around the idea that modernising the labour market and welfare 
system was needed to ensure French businesses were competitive. To their point 
of view, the time of a collective bargaining based on a rationale of accruing work-
ers’ rights was over. Instead, they advocated a more pragmatic negotiating stance 
based on discussion and mutual concessions. This combined accepting greater 
flexibility in employment, accounting for new aspirations among employees (e.g. 
independence at work by adopting more flexible hours) and protecting the most 
vulnerable workers’ interests (jobseekers, those in precarious employment) (Groux 
and Mouriaux, 1989). Moreover, at the outset of F. Mitterrand’s term as President 
cfdt representatives had sought and secured the development of new procedures 
for consultation and collective bargaining in companies. In their opinion, this was 
all the more reason to consider striking only as a last resort. The cfdt banked on 
its ability to negotiate ‘reasonable’ compromises to re-establish the legitimacy of 
its action with employees while positioning itself as a key actor for dialogue with 
employers and the government.
The cfdt’s reformist transformation triggered a sustained period in which the 
balance of power between French trade unions shifted. To begin with, this further 
isolated the cgt in protests against the introduction of neo-liberal labour market 
reforms that it continued to contest, by organizing numerous strikes and mass 
demonstrations. At the same time, it was behind lengthy local strikes, to protest 
against the closure of a great many industrial firms (especially in steel manufacturing, 
metalworking and the automobile sector), in which the cgt had a strong presence. 
These strike actions had also political reasons. Indeed, the turn to austerity adopted 
in 1984 led to departure of Communist ministers appointed to the government in 
1981. So, the protests organised had strong political significance: at the same time 
as the pcf, the cgt switched to a stance of politically opposing the Socialist govern-
ment, seeking to weaken it through social struggles (Mouriaux, 1998).
2. Martine Gilson, “Edmond Maire: la vieille mythologie syndicale de la grève à vécu”, Libération, 29 
October 1985.
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The decline and metamorphosis of strike action
The protest strategy adopted by the cgt was nevertheless insufficient to halt a 
decline in the intensity of strike action during the 1980s. The number of days 
not worked due to strike action (dnw) recorded in the 1970s hit record levels in 
France, as it did in many other Western European countries (Brandl and Traxler, 
2010). More than 3 million dnw were recorded in 1975, 1976 and again in 1979. 
By contrast, in the following years, the number of dnw fell sharply as can be seen 
in the graph below. From the mid-1980s, it was usually in the range of 250,000 
and 500,000 dnw. 
The fall in the number of strike days in France in the private sector (jint)
Scope: Private sector and nationalised public companies, 1975-2005, excluding transportation after 1996.
Source: Alexandre Carlier, “Mesurer les grèves dans les entreprises”, Documents d’Études de la dares, n. 139, 2008, n. 34.1.
This tail-off in strike action mirrored a substantial weakening of French trade 
union organisational and political capacities. At first, the trade unions’ political 
power was hit by the electoral meltdown of the pcf and its rapid retreat to the mar-
gins of French politics. French trade unionism also entered into a period of dwindling 
membership numbers. Membership rates fell to 11% of the working population, 
with strong disparities between the private (8%) and public sectors (20%). The fall 
in union members hit all organisations but especially the cgt, which lost two-thirds 
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of its members in just ten years. Isolated both politically and as a union movement 
then cut adrift from a large part of its activist base, the cgt’s ability to muster workers 
against the neo-liberal policies introduced from the 1980s was seriously hampered.
The drop in the level of industrial action also had economic causes. Just as elsewhere 
in Europe, the steepest drop in strike activity was in the private sector, due to the radical 
changes that happened in European economies (Sheuer, 2006). Firstly, the industrial 
sector has declined, whereas it was the most favourable ground for union action and 
strikes in the post-war period. Without this anchor point, the unions subsequently 
struggled to grow their activities in the new sectors of the service economy. As such, 
the rate of strike action in retail and private sector services still lagged behind those 
still recorded in industry (Béroud et al., 2008). 
Changes to the French production model itself consequently formed another 
significant obstacle to the growth of trade union action. Firstly, the average size 
of businesses was falling, leading to a fragmentation of the productive fabric and 
employment base. Secondly, these businesses tended to be increasingly dependent 
on large groups, controlled by a financial power much more mobile. All these organ-
isational and economic changes limited the ability of unions to organize mobiliza-
tions at a large scale. This was partly due to the extent of union presence and their 
abilities to trigger strikes being closely linked to company size (Béroud et al. 2008). 
Union action and strike activity is for the most part a feature in large companies, 
because labour relations are organised more collectively while hierarchical divisions 
are more pronounced. By contrast, labour relations in small firms are embedded in 
more personalised and paternalistic relationships of power. These hinder the ability 
of trade unions to appear as legitimate and useful mediators acting in the employees’ 
interests. Finally, the unions’ ability to muster support in the private sector has been 
hampered by the rise of job insecurity and the growth of lasting mass unemploy-
ment, which, as we know, contributes to heightening related risks for employees 
who might consider strike action.
In the private sector, especially, strikes were not only becoming increasingly rare 
but also more localised and fragmented (Bordogna and Cella, 2002). The vast major-
ity of strikes in the private sector are limited to the perimeter of a single company. 
Even in the industry, strike wide strike became much rarer compared to the past. 
In the same way, the involvement of privately owned company employees in strikes 
and demonstrations organised at the national level to oppose liberal government 
and employer policies became very limited. In essence, public sector employees now 
conducted these protest methods, which became rarer and rarer in the 1980s and 
1990s. The fragmentation of strike action in the commercial sector subsequently 
featured another new difficulty facing trade union organisations. This involved 
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their ability to re-register and combine company protests in broader disputes that 
no longer sought to exert economic pressure on a specific employer but operate as 
an instrument to challenge the policies of the government and employers’ repre-
sentatives. The splintering of trade union protests in the private sector must clearly 
be considered in relation to the fragmentation of productive fabric that makes 
organising and coordinating local union action much more difficult. Yet, it also 
stemmed from effects linked to decentralised collective bargaining procedures within 
companies. This process is common to all European industrial relations systems and 
accompanies liberal labour market reforms. It aims to make collective bargaining 
procedures as a means of adjusting the rules governing labour relations at the level 
of establishments (Andolfatto and Contrepois, 2016). The decentralised collective 
bargaining process has been especially strong in France and directly contributed to 
the fragmentation of trade union struggles by changing the nature of militant links, 
within the trade union organizations. 
Until 1968, trade unions had no legal existence within companies. That’s why 
trade unionist activities were mainly organised through local trade union institutions, 
les Bourses du travail and les Unions Locales. These internal trade union organisa-
tion arrangements subsequently favoured maintaining regular links between all the 
union members and in turn made it easier to muster member support around the 
challenge of common struggles (Shorter and Tilly, 1974). The institutionalisation of 
trade union representation in companies had the effect of weakening these militant 
links. Local union representatives first obtained new legal and operational resources 
(Béroud and Galvão, 2019). French trade unionists are subsequently less dependent 
on militant resources provided to them by their organizations to fulfil their union 
brief. At the same time, the growth of collective bargaining with company union 
representatives led the latter to spend most of their time on tasks representing their 
union in their establishment. This was especially so given the general climate of 
weakened trade unionism which tended to convince a lot of grass-roots militants 
that it was easier to mobilise and hope to win around local issues. Given that insti-
tutional and union resources enjoyed by trade unionists in the private sector are far 
smaller than those provided to their public sector counterparts, the first ones are 
logically less likely to see inter-professional disputes as major struggles worth getting 
involved with. In most cases, they prefer to focus their efforts on internal matters, 
thus contributing to a significant division between local trade union activities and 
union demonstrations called by central union leaders.
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Between resurgence and ongoing constraints to trade union action (1995-2017)
Despite the waning in their activist roots, trade unions did not, however, lose their 
power of mobilization. On the contrary, from 1995 to 2010, in a political context 
marked by a series of neo-liberal welfare system and labour market reforms, France 
was once again the setting for several waves of large trade union disputes. This re-
surgence in social conflicts is not specific to France. Over the same period, it can be 
observed in a large number of European Union Member States, which also brought 
forward bills to make structural reforms to the labour market and welfare systems. 
France was nevertheless one of the countries that experienced the largest number of 
strikes and protests (Gall, 2013). On several occasions, the unions succeed in orga-
nizing a series of national strikes and large demonstrations. Some of these attracted 
several million workers to protest in the streets while renewable strikes sometimes 
occurred in different professional sectors (railway workers, teaching, refineries). The 
size of this resurgence in trade union action reveals the resilience of specific traits 
inherent in labour relations in France. That said, the unions’ protest strategies to 
counter government policies were taking new forms and encountering significant 
limits. The new fall in trade union action during the 2010s provides evidence of 
this, all the more so as liberal policies accelerated and further added to this trend 
during this time. 
Boxed text – 1995-2016: Trade Union Protests Against Liberal Reforms
1995: Long strike action (3 weeks) by railway workers and Parisian drivers, as 
well as national against the financial reform of the social security system and the 
railway workers’ pension scheme. The government wanted to end the possibility 
for these employees to retire earlier. It was forced to give it up after the protests 
brought together more than two million people. On the other hand, the social 
security reform has been adopted.
2003: Ten days of protests organised from January to July against pension reforms 
proposed by the Raffarin government. This law extends to the public sector the 
pension reform initiated in the private sector in 1993. In particular, it provides for 
an increase in the number of working years required for retirement. More than one 
million protesters in early June and long strike action in the state education system.
2006: French high school students’ unions and all staff organisations arranged 
several days of strike action to protest against the “First Employment Contract 
Scheme” facilitating redundancy arrangements for young employees. 1-3 million 
protesters recorded.
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2009: 4 days of strikes and protests against austerity policies adopted to address 
the financial crisis. The largest protests attracted 1 to 3 million employees.
2010: 11 days of strikes and protests organised between 27 May and 23 November 
to oppose the rise in retirement age. Claims of 3.5 million demonstrators on 12 
October, renewable strikes commence at the sncf and oil refineries.
2016: Demonstrations against the reform of the French Labour Code and collec-
tive bargaining procedures (“the Labour Act”), intended to facilitate redundancy 
procedures and employment flexibility agreements. An online petition gathered 
1.5 million signatures.
2019: new wave of strikes and mass demonstrations against a government plan 
to reform the pension system, accused to encourage the implementation of a 
private pension system.
Disputes displaying a still-limited political influence of the unions
In a European context driven with quite similar liberally inspired policies, the range 
of national institutional and political circumstances framing trade union action 
constitutes a chief explanatory factor that is key to the diversity of strike activity 
intensity observed in various European Union Member States (Kelly et al., 2013). 
Indeed, he propensity of trade unionists to use strike weapon partly varies with 
the institutional and political resources they can muster in the political exchange 
process with the State and the employers (Pizzorno, 1978). However, in contrast 
to so-called neo-corporatist models (especially in the Scandinavian countries and 
Austria) in which trade union organisations are strongly embedded in the political 
decision-making process (Korpi and Shalev, 1980), French trade unions still have very 
limited power to influence political decision-making processes (Kelly et al., 2013).
Clearly, trade union representatives now have regular dialogue with the State but 
they are still very much subordinate in terms of political power. Firstly, despite the 
growth of collective bargaining procedures, the French State still plays a central role 
in determining the rules governing social models (Howell, 2009). In other countries, 
the principle of independent decision-making in collective bargaining between em-
ployers and unions continues to impose the conditions for government interventions 
in social and economic matters. On the contrary, French governments constantly 
threatened to bypass any eventual opposition from trade unions to reforms by pass-
ing legislation ignoring their opinions. This political pressure contributed to forcing 
trade unions to accept to negotiate the implementation of neoliberal reforms that 
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the government wanted to adopt in return for the promise of a few concessions. In 
doing so, they also avoided having their institutional position challenged together 
with the related benefits (organisational, financial and symbolic) they enjoyed. 
French trade union leaders are also suffering from the weakness of their relays in 
the central administration, and the dwindling of their links with Left-wing parties 
(Howell and Daley, 1992). The collapse of the pcf plus the distancing of relations 
between the ps and cfdt meant that backing from supporters and institutional 
bodies that could be mustered by the unions had never been at such low levels. 
As such, there are now very few trade union leaders among Ministerial officials, 
including in Left-Wing governments. The very limited institutional and partisan 
resources that French trade unions can activate in the political field why the use of 
collective action still occupies a central role in the implementation of trade union 
action strategies to try and change the outcome of consultation procedures that the 
unions frequently criticise for their formal nature.
Variable trade union alliance processes
As we have seen, French trade union leaders were nonetheless split in the way they 
view striking and neoliberal policies. As such, during a series of disputes in 1995 and 
2003, the cfdt managers decided (with the cftc) to not take part in the protests 
started by other trade union organisations. In addition to its ‘reformist’ switch, the 
management of the cfdt agreed to support ongoing government welfare reforms, 
primarily as it deemed these reforms necessary to support a competitive French 
economy. The cfdt also justified its involvement in negotiations as a way of obliging 
the government to make concessions in return for securing the support of some trade 
unions and thus give additional legitimacy to the reforms undertaken. The cfdt, 
for example, went on to secure an agreement that successive measures to extend the 
age of retirement were coupled with greater recognition for the arduous nature of 
work and the length of working careers when calculating retirement age and pension 
amounts paid out. The choice made by the cfdt leaders in these negotiations can 
be explained by the benefits it hoped to secure in a competitive French trade union 
environment. At first, this was actually the means to strengthen its position as first 
interlocutor of the Employers and the State. It also hoped to boost its credibility in 
the eyes of employees by appearing to be able to reconcile a pragmatic approach for 
economic problems with defending the interests of the most vulnerable sections of 
the workforce by securing new rights for them. On the other hand, it blamed its 
competing trade unions of taking pleasure in adopting a purely dissenting position 
and defending the continuation of a welfare system that had failed to halt growing 
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inequalities between employees on the labour market and in access to social rights 
(unemployment benefit and pensions, in particular). 
Nevertheless, trade union alliances and divisions in the face of neo-liberal reforms 
vary according economic and political circumstances. Indeed, all the unions joined 
forces against the government in 2006, 2009 and 2010. The meeting of trade union 
minds is relatively rare in France and can best explain the strength and length of 
union protests in 2009 and 2010. In 2006, the trade union alliance came about by 
the weight of mass protests by students and high-school pupils who teamed up to 
oppose a reform that threatened to undermine the conditions of their joining the 
labour market. The sheer numbers of young demonstrators caused the bill to be 
abandoned and encouraged all trade unions to support and seize this dispute to 
protest against a more general loosening of the rules on redundancies. Following 
on from this successful, all the trade unions came together again in 2009 and 2010 
to organize numerous strikes and demonstrations. Given the surge in company 
restructures caused by the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, 
trade union divisions faded away behind a series of demands focusing on defending 
social rights, purchasing power and regulating the financial sector to protect workers.
In these two periods of protest, the united front of the unions was based primarily 
on challenges related to labour market reform and defending the most vulnerable 
employees. These challenges were less divisive for the unions compared to those 
linked to welfare reform. The trade union coalition was also formed as a reaction 
to the temptation of the governments concerned to prevent all trade unions from 
having any input to their decision-making processes. In 2006, for example, the Prime 
Minister, Dominique De Villepin, totally bypassed trade union leaders, who learned 
of the existence of his bill through the press. Elected French President in 2007, 
Nicolas Sarkozy took a highly vindictive attitude towards the trade unions that he 
described as archaic counter-powers that were barely representative and had little 
authority. From the first months of his term, he championed a bill to place more re-
strictions on the right to strike for workers in the public transport sector. The radical 
position adopted by the new President made it easier for employees’ organisations 
to join forces since it resulted in marginalising even the so-called ‘reformist’ trade 
unions that were unable to justify their action in the field of negotiation that the 
government refused to engage in (Béroud and Yon, 2012).
The organisational factors of the mobilising paradoxical power of French trade unionism
As the theory of collective action suggests (Tilly, 1984), union strategies take differ-
ent forms according to the balance between government strategies, organisational 
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resources that trade union leaders possess and the familiarity they maintain with 
collective action weapons. As such, the scale of trade union mobilisation in the 2000s 
might come as a surprise given the low membership numbers. This apparent paradox 
firstly stems from the profile of union leaders (national and local) from the three 
main central trade unions that were key to rallying member support (in descending 
order, the cgt, the teachers union, the fsu3, and Sud-Solidaires to a lesser extent). 
These three organisations are part of a strand of French trade unionism marked by 
its historic proximity to Left wing parties, especially the Communist Party and the 
Trotskyite Far-Left. Clearly, these connections are now weaker and the leaders of 
these trade unions are currently united behind the principle of union action inde-
pendent from political parties. There is nevertheless plenty of exchange between 
these activist spheres at union management levels (Giraud et al., 2018). Many of 
union officials inherited a Left-Wing political socialisation and, as such, remain very 
much imbued with an anti-liberal militant ethos that is still focused on a highly 
Marxist vision of labour relations. Finally, these unions official are recruited among 
grass roots militants. For this reason also, the organisation of strikes and protests 
is part of the militant practices with they are particularly familiar (Giraud, 2009).
The leaders of these trade unions also retain a genuine power to drum up support 
in the public sector. Trade union membership rates have stayed at around 20% in the 
public sector, with most cgt, fsu and Sud-Solidaires members coming from public 
administrations and companies. This bastion of unionism stems primarily from the 
employment protection status afforded to civil servants, which makes union mem-
bership and strike action less risky. In addition, the status of civil servants centres 
on a strong professional identity in conjunction with collective rules to manage jobs 
and wages, helping to establish more coherent professional groups that are easier 
to mobilise. To achieve this, trade unions can call on institutional resources that 
are far greater than those enjoyed by their private sector counterparts. Trade union 
representatives in the civil service are, for example, directly linked to managing the 
careers of civil servants. As such, they more easily position themselves as possible 
sources of help for civil servants to resolve their problems. Finally, trade unions in 
the public sector enjoy access to greater financial resources and a larger number of 
permanent staff indirectly funded by the State (Giraud et al., 2018). 
The activist and organisational roots of these trade unions in the public sector 
formed an even stronger platform to trigger disputes in the 2000s than plans to 
reform the welfare system especially affected public sector workers. Indeed, one of 
the main aims stated by the governments was challenging special welfare benefits 
3. fsu: Fédération Syndicale Unitaire
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enjoying public sector workers (taking retirement especially) to bring them into line 
with private sector employees. In a public sector threatened by numerous reforms 
(liberalisation, decentralisation) generating social tension, the widespread involve-
ment of its employees in national protests proceeded from a mixed of grievances. 
These were a combination of general opposition to government policies and defend-
ing the corporation’s own rights. In 1995, as in 2010, the French railway workers were 
central to opposing governmental reforms as they sought, in particular, to challenge 
the special pension system that railway workers benefited from. Similarly, in 2003, 
protests against plans to reform the French pension system were also based on the 
involvement of teachers who took part in a long protest movement. This primarily 
sought to oppose the government’s decision to allocate part of the non-teaching 
staff from the French education system to the regional councils: this measure was 
seen by the protesters as the thin end of the wedge in contesting the status of these 
public sector workers. 
Finally, these mass protests in the 2000s are linked to a wider resurgence in 
conflicting relations in the workplace. While European surveys indicate that the 
fall in strike action continued in the 2000s (Vandaele, 2016), the French data on 
labour conflicts reveal that the proportion of French establishments that experienced 
collective disputes, with or without work stoppages, actually rose considerably at 
the start of the 2000s (by 10 points) then settled down until the end of the decade 
(Giraud and Marcelino, 2019). From an economic theory standpoint, this surge in 
strikes can be put down to a return to economic growth in the early 2000s, which 
coincided with a sharp decline in unemployment (Coutrot, 2001). Conversely, be-
tween 2008 and 2010, the economic downturn did not trigger an immediate drop 
in strike action. It can even be seen that strikes actually rose in establishments faced 
with a fall in business and plans to restructure. In other words, the tensions generated 
by the economic downturn contributed, at least initially, to creating conflicts that 
encouraged trade union leaders to prolong and step them up by organising national 
demonstrations when the spectre of new austerity policies appeared.
Persistent limits on union mobilization power
This revival in trade union protests has nevertheless declined sharply in the last few 
years. It is symptomatic of the limits of union mobilization power, which were al-
ready visible in the protests that took place in the 2000s. This protest activity firstly 
showed the limits that the trade union leaders, even those tagged as “dissenters”, set 
themselves in the use of strike weapon to challenge government policy. Throughout 
these various periods of protest, the leaders of the cgt refused, in particular, to 
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call a renewable general strike, even when the processions of demonstrators had at-
tracted several million workers. The refusal to engage in a strategy to radicalise trade 
union mobilisation can be explained by the separation that the leaders of the cgt 
now perceived necessary to maintain between strategies of trade union campaigns 
and partisan struggles. Obviously, organising strike action and mass protests is still 
an instrument of political struggle used by trade unions to exert pressure on the 
government (Gall, 2013). That said, trade union leaders in general are still wary of 
maintaining their activities within the field of collective bargaining, with the sole 
aim of voicing their demands more effectively to the government. As a result, trade 
union leaders want to retain their authority as spokespersons for mobilising employ-
ees and above all avoid being dispossessed in favour of other stakeholders, especially 
political participants. Therefore, the prospect of calling a renewable general strike 
is likely to create a situation of political crisis that may give the opposition parties a 
key role rather than trade union organisations (Giraud, 2006).
Furthermore, the shape and form of these large-scale union demonstrations 
reflects the difficulties encountered by union leaders to encourage private sector 
workers’ mobilization. Throughout the decade, their participation in the mass 
demonstrations of, and even more in the strikes, remains very limited. The gap in 
participation between private and public sector employees undermines the legitimacy 
of these trade union rallies, often denounced by the press and political leaders as just 
“privileged” employees protesting. This situation deepens union leaders’ hesitations 
to opt for more radical strategies that would risk making the participation of pri-
vate sector employees even more difficult (Giraud, 2006). Finally, the unions have 
widely failed, with the exception of 2006, to secure the withdrawal of controversial 
government plans or genuine consideration for their demands for new social rights 
for employees vulnerable to job insecurity. 
The outcome of this cycle of protests is one aspect that explains, along with oth-
ers, the further decline in the intensity of labour disputes since 2010, whereas liberal 
reforms to welfare and the labour market have been on the rise under the Presiden-
cies of F. Hollande (Socialist Party) in 2012, then E. Macron in 2017. Clearly, the 
El Khomri Act (2016), which introduced new flexible employment measures and 
a far-reaching review of collective bargaining rules triggered new resistances4. A 
petition was launched on social networks outside all official trade union channels. 
It quickly secured more than one million signatures, consequently encouraging 
4. Inspired by the recommendations of the European Commission and other reforms undertaken in Eu-
ropean Union countries, the bill is organized around three objectives: to facilitate economic dismissals, 
to cap the compensation received in case of unfair dismissal and to lower the level of overtime pay.
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union leaders to organise several demonstrations. This time, the protests nevertheless 
remained on a much smaller scale (Béroud, 2018). Following on, E. Macron under-
took even more radical reforms from the start of his Presidential term that didn’t 
manage to spark proper collective protest action until the end of 2019. This social 
apathy can be explained by a combination of structural and cyclical factors. Firstly, 
as they were deemed to be failures, the experience of protests in the 2010s was able, 
at least temporarily, to amplify the difficulties trade unions had in mustering sup-
port considering that it stoked the feeling among employees that strike action and 
demonstrations were ineffective forms of action to reverse governmental decisions. 
At the same time, the public sector endured the introduction of managerial policies 
directly imported from the private sector (widespread growth of unstable employ-
ment contracts5, individual wage and career policies). This gradually undermined 
the potential of trade union protest action.
Finally, political changes that have taken place at the government level during 
the 2010’s have also contributed to the slowing down of social conflict. The François 
Hollande’s mandate seems to provide proof that the presence of a Left-Wing gov-
ernment hinders the growth of collective protest action, independently of the way 
in which they involve trade unions in their decisions (Brandl and Traxler, 2010). 
Firstly, maintaining a special relationship between leaders of the ps and cfdt helps 
understand that this main trade union body prefers to stand out from other unions 
to yet again focus on looking for a compromise to implementing reforms. Secondly, 
it is more difficult for trade union organisations to mobilise employees against 
neo-liberal political reforms when a Left-Wing government introduces them. Trade 
unions opposed to these reforms actually saw themselves politically isolated when 
challenging them. They also found it all the more difficult to persuade employees 
that they could oppose alternative choices to liberal policies defended by the major-
ity and the opposition.
To conclude: A new sequence of neo-liberal reforms and union resistance with
president Macron
The current French President, Emmanuel Macron, was elected from outside the major 
French parties, but is perfectly in line with the liberal policies of his predecessors. 
Since his unexpected victory, he has pushed up a series of measures to make the mar-
5. The public service is not immune to the development of precarious and flexible employment standards. 
In recent years, more than half of the staff recruited by the State have been recruited on fixed-term 
contracts over time (Peyrin, 2019).
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ket of labour more and more flexible. To this end, the process of decentralization of 
collective bargaining has been significantly amplified. From now on, company-level 
agreements will most often take precedence over industry-level collective agreements. 
This gives employers new leeway to increase the flexibility of their employees and 
reduce wages. These laws also provide for the possibility, based on the German 
model, of negotiating “competitiveness” agreements, whereby employees are asked 
to accept a reduction in their pay and an increase in their working time in exchange 
for maintaining their jobs. At the same time, finally, the number of employee rep-
resentatives in companies has been reduced by a third, and the powers and means 
of action of trade unionists have been severely curtailed. French trade unionism 
thus appears more than ever to be weakened and its legitimacy called into question, 
with President Macron distinguishing himself by his willingness to denigrate trade 
unions and all intermediary bodies. The trade unions appeared totally powerless 
to challenge in any way the policies implemented by President Macron during his 
first two years in office. In particular, they have totally failed to mobilise employees 
against a highly contested unemployment insurance reform voted in spring 20196.
Until 2019, the protest movement that has most disrupted the new government 
did not emerge from trade union (and partisan) organisations. The “Gilets Jaunes” 
(yellow vests) movement initially grew as a reaction to a rise in fuel prices before 
extending to cover more conventional social demands linked, in particular, to pur-
chasing power. This mobilization brought together individuals who had hitherto 
had little experience of mobilization, often in precarious situations on the labour 
market or working in small businesses, without contact with trade unions. The trade 
union leaders have stayed at the margins of this protest movement and have failed to 
expand it in companies and administrations. They have found their ability directly 
challenged, not only to resist the raft of liberal reforms but also to convey the social 
demands of the most downtrodden segments of workers. 
Trade unions, however, do not (yet) belong to the “old world” that President 
Macron claims to be disappearing. Indeed, the latest reform of the pension system, 
discussed at the time this article is written, is once again provoking a great deal of 
trade union mobilization. Demonstrations have brought together more than a mil-
lion workers, and Parisian train and metro drivers have been on strike for more than 
a month. A record since the strikes in 1995 in the same two sectors. In spite of the 
unexpected intensity of these strikes, they have failed – at the time of writing – to 
6. For example, a few months before the reform of the pension system, all the French trade unions con-
tested a reform of the unemployment insurance system that reduces benefits, introduces degressivity of 
benefits and shortens the duration of benefits. But they were unable to mobilize to prevent its adoption 
by the French parliament.
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secure withdrawal of the reform. In fact, this latest protest movement has followed 
the same pattern of mobilization as in the past: strike action is remained mainly 
concentrated in the public service or in strategic economic sectors (transport, ports, 
energy). Even if public opinion is overwhelmingly supportive of the strikers, this 
sympathy does not translate into a wider participation of the different segments of 
the workforce in the mass demonstrations. This protest demonstrates that the ca-
pacity of French trade unions to use strikes and demonstrations as an instrument of 
political pressure remains hampered by the transformations of the French economy. 
Not only because it is more difficult to block the French economy in the context 
of a globalized economy. But also because it remains difficult to envisage the pos-
sibility or advisability of committing to these forms of action for many employees, 
particularly those who are most in a precarious situation on the labour market. It 
is therefore difficult to oppose, through mobilization, the reforms that affect the 
most precarious employees. Thus, through its ability to mobilise the most stabilised 
fractions of the workforce, French trade unions have been able to slow down the 
introduction of neo-liberal reforms, in comparison with many other eu countries. 
Thus, through its ability to mobilise the most stabilised fractions of the workforce, 
French trade unions have been able to slow down the introduction of neo-liberal 
reforms, in comparison with many other eu countries. But it is not enough to pre-
vent the development of precarious work, the segmentation of labour market, and 
the gradual calling into question of the social protection system, which until then 
had been recognised as one of the most protective in the world.
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Abstract
The changing face of union action put to test by neo-liberals reforms in France
This article reviews how French trade union are coping with the neo-liberal policies since the 
early 1980s. It shows their divergent reactions, and how these liberal reforms are implemented 
in a context of transformation of trade union action: the use of strikes is more difficult at the 
same time as the relationship between trade unions and collective bargaining is transformed in a 
logic of depoliticizing their strategies of action. These developments did not prevent a resurgence 
of strikes in the 2000s. It reveals the limits of the trade unions’ power of political influence, 
that implies the use of collective action. However, strikes have declined further in recent years, 
revealing the weakening of trade union mobilisation power.
Keywords: Strikes; French Trude Unionism; Collective bargaining; Neo-liberalism; Contentious 
politics.
Resumo
A recomposição da ação sindical na França em um contexto de reformas liberais
O artigo examina como o sindicalismo francês enfrenta, desde o início dos anos de 1980, as 
políticas neo-liberais. Identificamos suas reações divergentes e como as reformas neo-liberais 
são implementadas em um contexto de transformação da ação sindical: o uso das greves é mais 
difícil e a relação entre os sindicatos e a negociação coletiva é transformada em uma lógica que 
despolitiza suas estratégias de ação. Esses desenvolvimentos, porém, não impediram o ressurgi-
mento das greves nos anos 2000. O artigo revela ainda os limites da força de influência política 
dos sindicatos, que implica o uso da ação coletiva. Nos últimos anos, as greves declinaram, 
revelando o enfraquecimento do poder de mobilização dos sindicatos.
Palavras-chave: Greves; Sindicalismo francês; Negociação coletiva; Neoliberalismo; Confronto 
político.
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